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BRAVE
New World?
SHEIK, Rattle 
and ROLL
Australia's intervention in the Gulf crisis was hasty and 
muddled. Sanctions don't necessarily need force to back them up, argues 
Richard Leaver. And a new, more contemporary role 
for the UN is needed.
T he best strategic advice to come out of Canberra about the Gulf Crisis came too late and was sent in the wrong 
direction. When it was clear that Iraqi 
forces were actively rounding up western 
hostages, Australian nationals in Kuwait were 
advised "to consider the advantages of maintain­
ing a low profile".
The acute dilemma which our nationals now confront 
individually is largely due to the fact that no one gave 
similar advice to Mr Hawke two weeks earlier.
Given our status as an important Iraqi trading partner, it 
is possible that a low profile coupled with quiet diplomacy 
through the initial stages of the Gulf crisis could have
secured the release of those citizens who are now trapped 
in what looks like a war zone. In any case, a lower profile 
would have left us free to think more rationally - and with 
more information to hand - about how best to respond to 
the' problem of world order' which the flagrant use of force 
by Iraq undoubtedly raises.
Even if we had subsequently decided to send ships, we 
could at least have entered the fray with clearer purpose - 
and perhaps with cleaner hands.
However, the passage of time suggests a number of good 
reasons why we might have thought twicc before commit­
ting Australian ships to the multilateral fo. ce which now 
exists. First, the structure of that force confuses what is 
necessary to achieve two quite distinct tasks - the need to 
reassure the Gulf states in the face of an Iraqi military
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threat, and the need to gain leverage through an economic 
embargo. The multilateral force currently in place goes 
much further than is necessary for either of these ends. The 
consequence is not only a dangerous escalation in offensive 
force levels, but also the crowding out of opportunities for 
diplomacy and political solutions.
The military threat which Iraq poses to the Gulf States 
comes mainly from large tank forces. But it is questionable 
whether Iraq has the air superiority necessary to put those 
tanks to use. The Iraqi air force performed badly in the 
Iranian war even when its adversary had trouble getting 
planes off the ground. The air-to-air capabilities of the 
existing air force of the Gulf States are already in an entirely 
different league and could be supplemented. The Saudi 
kingdom also needs the specific anti-tank capability which 
A-lOs and heavy helicopters can give.
Stealth weapons, marines and carrier battlegroups over­
achieve this objective of reassurance in a manner which is 
dangerously offensive in the short run and, almost certain­
ly, politically counterproductive in the long run.
None of the 'boys' own' talk of 'surgical strikes' satisfac­
torily discusses the likely state of the Iraqi body politic on 
the day after surgery, or the damage - both physical and 
political - which surgery would conceivably inflict, possib­
ly through an Iraqi scorched earth policy, upon the centre 
of gravity of the world's oil industry.
Second, the necessity to enforce UN-mandated economic 
sanctions at the point of the gun - the specific task for which 
Australian ships have been committed, even if they will 
not initiate hostilities - has never been clearly explained. 
The fact that there are only three exit routes for significant 
quantities of Iraqi oil exports makes it superficially appeal­
ing to think of sanctions enforcement in terms of a military 
blockade.
But even if the sanctions net can be made perfectly water­
tight, Iraq has sufficient stocks of food to last at least several 
months. Time is not in itself an issue of great urgency.
It is wise to remember that sanctions do not need to be 
applied to 'the producer end' of a market in order to exert 
useful effects. The single most successful case of the 
manipulation of the oil market for political ends - the shut 
out of the Mossadegh regime - was achieved by denying 
Iran its traditional markets within the vertically-integrated 
oil market of the 1950s. The example is well worth further 
investigation.
Significantly higher levels of production will now be 
forthcoming from some OPEC states, and there are record 
levels of private and IEA stockpiles. It is technically pos­
sible to substitute these sources for Iraqi-Kuwaiti exports. 
Since Iraq's international customers have vigorously con­
demned the invasion, we can presume that they will 
choose to avail themselves of such supplies as they become 
available. As with the Rhodesian sanctions, the UN would
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establish a committee to monitor compliance with its man­
dated sanctions.
In this way, a boycott organised from the consumer end of 
the oil market could be just about as economically efficient 
as sanctions backed by force in the Gulf.
Without military enforcement, Iraq would undoubtedly 
try to 'launder' its oil at a heavy discount, and it would 
probably have some success. Some 'sanctions leakage' 
would not be an unambiguous bad thing. It would keep 
the spot market flush with oil, so building a ceiling over 
price rises that are already assuming ominous proportions. 
It would open the way to effectively linking the degree of 
'tightness' in the sanctions net to multilateral diplomatic 
efforts to effect an Iraqi withdrawal.
In these senses, 'leakages' in a sanctions net are not neces­
sarily a fatal defect that must be plugged at all costs - 
especially when these costs entail dangerous military es­
calation. Such flaws can create diplomatic openings - the 
sorts of openings which are sorely needed in this crisis. 
Present efforts to impose 'watertight sanctions' foreclose 
such openings, while compounding the sources of military 
instability in the Gulf.
“A consumer boycott 
could be as efficient as 
sanctions backed by  
force. ”
Third, the government's attempt to sell their decision 'to 
be seen to be there' in terms of a rejuvenation of the UN is 
an ill-conceived and cheap ploy which diverts attention 
from actions that might better serve this worthy end.
From what we already know of the decision-making 
processes on the Gulf crisis, the Hawke government clearly 
revealed a preference for 'good American citizenship' over 
'good international citizenship' which it has verbally 
espoused through recent years. Among other things, this 
preference seriously undercuts the always fragile domestic 
legitimacy which successive defence ministers have been 
trying to piece together around the theme of 'the defence 
of Australia'. If we were, for instance, at the beginning 
rather than the end of the ANZAC frigate debate, it would 
today probably look like a rerun of the carrier debate of the 
early 1980s. And since that preference comes on top of an 
already exposed position over the Johnson Atoll issue, we 
can rest assured that our citizenship credentials will be 
carefully analysed around the Pacific and South East Asia.
It is naive to see the manner in which this crisis has been 
managed as signalling some sort of rebirth for the United 
Nations to which we must 'bear witness'. The breaking of 
the usual deadlock which binds the Security Council to 
inaction is new, but there are good reasons for doubting 
whether the key that has opened that lock will prove 
durable and robust in future crises. It may not even survive 
the full course of this crisis. That will largely depend on 
how the US actually uses its forces currently in the Gulf. 
The fact that none of the Security Council resolutions 
explicitly mentions the use of force, and that the USSR 
subsequently announced it would not be contributing to 
the multilateral force, suggests that the veil of UN 
legitimacy is paper thin. But it is necessary to be fully 
aware of the specific conditions which have provided the 
key to the deadlock. It is highly likely that promises of 
side-payments - possibly economic aid - were made to 
secure this minimal Soviet acquiescence. If side-payments 
from one economically moribund superpower to another 
are to provide the foundation for a new world order, it 
would not seem to have many of the characteristics of 
stability that are desirable.
A more effective and central role for the United Nations in 
a post Cold War world is a laudable aim. That objective, 
however, will not be realised through the sort of heavy 
unilateralism thinly veiled as multilateralism that was 
precisely one of the primary characteristics of the Cold 
War. One can be forgiven for thinking that the manage­
ment of this crisis looks more like a victory celebration over 
the race to 'the end of history' than a serious effort to build 
more effective international institutions.
It is also clear that an improved UN will not be realised so 
long as it remains wedded to principles of international 
law that are built on lessons handed down from the 
Munich era. The principle that the use of force is not an 
acceptable way to redraw state boundaries is important, 
but it is only the beginning of legal order appropriate to a 
post Cold War world.
When this principle is used to defend 'the divine right of 
kings', it immediately becomes apparent that any ade­
quate conception of social justice is sadly lacking in current 
international law. If the UN is to have a useful role to play 
in the brave new world - where a major issue is likely to be 
the redrawing of state borders through much of the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Bloc - then an equally important place 
will have to be found for notions of citizenship.
An important part of the heritage of the Labor government 
is built on memories of a better international legal order. 
In the years before the Cold War became the governing 
principle of international politics, Evatt made a distin­
guished effort to redress inequalities of power within the 
UN and broaden the legitimacy of its rule of law. If the 
international system is indeed beginning to escape from 
the jaws of the superpower vise, then Canberra should be 
giving serious thought about how thfo lapsed agenda 
could be reactivated.
Finally, some breathing space might have saved the 
government from digging in behind highly questionable
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general arguments which are potentially damaging to fu­
ture Australian regional interests. In recent years our 
defence ministers have been talking of the more complex -
Iand allegedly more dangerous - world which lies at the end of the Cold War. This reminds me of the words with which Neville Meaney concluded his documentary study of 
Australian foreign policy published several years ago: 
"Australians have allowed sentiment to dictate the lessons 
from experience. The result has been that, lacking a proper
* perspective, they have often pursued a crude 
'realism'...which in its one dimensional single-mindedness 
has often threatened to bring on the very events that it 
professes to avert."
The invasion of Kuwait now provides the first semi- 
plausible evidence for this romantic hypothesis about the
• stability which went with the Cold War, and about the
dangers which are said to lie ahead. The quarantining of 
defence spending in the recent federal budget, and its 
subsequent supplementation, are evidence that this 
hypothesis has already been taken on board as fact.
But if that is so, then perhaps the believers in these facts 
would care to explain how Saddam managed to unleash a 
murderous war on Iran during one of the high points of 
the Cold War. Where was the restraining influence of su­
perpower rule on that occasion? A fair answer to that 
anomaly might then lead them to think twice before decid­
ing that the ability to wage war is the single best guarantor 
of peace in our comer of the globe.
RICHARD LEAVER is a research fellow in the Department 
of International Relations at ANU.
Credibility
GULF
Saddam Hussein is posing as the champion of a resurgent Arab 
nationalism. Michael Humphrey isn't convinced.
hen Lawrence of Arabia led the Arab 
revolt against the Ottoman Turks in 
1916, Arab nationalism was put in the 
service of Western imperialist goals in 
the Middle East. When Saddam Hussein invaded 
Iran in 1980 in pursuit of secular Arab 
nationalism, the West was willingly persuaded 
that Iraq's war aims were compatible with theirs. 
They permitted themselves to believe Saddam 
was acting as their client, protecting the conser­
vative, oil-rich Gulf states. From this Western 
clientist perspective, Saddam has bitten the hand 
that fed him by invading Kuwait. What he has 
done is to declare that he was acting in his own 
interests all along.
Saddam Hussein has sought to justify his occupation and 
annexation of Kuwait on the grounds of historic territorial 
rights and the unification of the Arab nation. At a strategic
level these claims are pragmatic and designed to under­
mine the Arab governments opposing Iraq's annexation of 
Kuwait - especially Egypt and Syria - by promoting 
popular dissent against them. Saddam's post-hoc appeal 
to Arab nationalism seeks to rekindle populist support for 
the Arab cause to regain dignity, autonomy and control 
over their own destinies.
The populist nature of pan-Arabism has been the creation 
of the state of Israel in the Arab world at the expense of the 
Palestinians. The other main issue has been control over 
resources, especially oil. At the hightide of support for 
pan-Arabism under Nasser from 1956 to 1967 the grand 
anti-imperialist causes were the 'liberation of Palestine' 
and control over the Suez canal.
In inter-Arab state politics one's pan-Arab credentials and 
aspirations for leadership of the Arab world have been 
measured by one's words and actions towards Israel and 
the Palestinian cause. Successive Iraqi regimes have cer­
tainly championed the Arab cause against Israel by sup­
porting the PLO, sending troops into Syria during 1973
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